Don't tax me? : Determinants of individual attitudes toward progressive taxation by Heinemann, Friedrich & Hennighausen, Tanja
Dis cus si on Paper No. 10-017
Don’t Tax Me? 
Determinants of Individual Attitudes
Toward Progressive Taxation
Friedrich Heinemann and Tanja Hennighausen
Dis cus si on Paper No. 10-017
Don’t Tax Me? 
Determinants of Individual Attitudes
Toward Progressive Taxation
Friedrich Heinemann and Tanja Hennighausen
Die Dis cus si on Pape rs die nen einer mög lichst schnel len Ver brei tung von 
neue ren For schungs arbei ten des ZEW. Die Bei trä ge lie gen in allei ni ger Ver ant wor tung 
der Auto ren und stel len nicht not wen di ger wei se die Mei nung des ZEW dar.
Dis cus si on Papers are inten ded to make results of ZEW  research prompt ly avai la ble to other 
eco no mists in order to encou ra ge dis cus si on and sug gesti ons for revi si ons. The aut hors are sole ly 
respon si ble for the con tents which do not neces sa ri ly repre sent the opi ni on of the ZEW.
Download this ZEW Discussion Paper from our ftp server:
ftp://ftp.zew.de/pub/zew-docs/dp/dp10017.pdf
Non-Technical Summary
Highly progressive tax systems entail disincentives for private economic activity and, thus,
may hamper potential growth. Nevertheless, attempts to introduce alternative tax schedules
regularly encounter significant political resistance. The aim of this paper is to widen the
understanding of the determinants of individual attitudes toward progressive taxation and,
therefore, the assessment of the political feasibility of tax reform proposals.
Conventional political-economic theories usually explain redistributive preferences based on
a narrow self-interest calculus. These theories however do not offer a rational for the fact that
in many industrial countries the majority of voters seem to prefer progressive tax rates. In
order to provide a comprehensive analysis of the determinants of individual attitudes toward
progressive taxation, our analysis is not confined to pure self-interest but also introduces
fairness aspects (e.g., fairness preferences, economic beliefs and fairness assessment of the
status quo).
Our empirical analysis is based on the representative data from the German General Social
Survey (ALLBUS) for the year 2000. Next to information on the respondents’ tax rate pref-
erences, this survey offers valuable data on a wide range of individual fairness considerations
as well as objective data on the respondents’ socioeconomic characteristics.
The empirical findings indicate that the individual attitudes toward progressive taxation are
not only driven by the corresponding self-interest. Furthermore, fairness considerations play
a major role in the formation of tax rate preferences: Persons without strong preferences for a
distribution of (financial) means according to the need-principle, who do stress the relevance
of individual effort for economic success and judge the present income distribution to be
fair are less likely to demand higher tax rates for high income earners than for low income
individuals. The finding that individuals do not necessarily choose the tax system that is
most beneficial to them but also care about its fairness has important policy implications:
A successful selling of (growth-enhancing) tax reforms should address this fairness related
concerns as well.
Zusammenfassung
Eine progressive Einkommensbesteuerung kann sich zwar negativ auf die individuellen Anrei-
ze fu¨r privatwirtschaftliche Aktivita¨t und damit auch auf das gesamtwirtschaftliche Wachs-
tum auswirken, Reformvorhaben mit dem Ziel der Einfu¨hrung alternativer Steuersysteme
stoßen jedoch regelma¨ßig auf erheblichen politischen Widerstand. Die vorliegende Arbeit
soll daher zu einem besseren Versta¨ndnis der Determinanten der individuellen Einstellung
gegenu¨ber progressiver Besteuerung und damit auch der politischen Durchsetzbarkeit ent-
sprechender Reformmaßnahmen beitragen.
Traditionelle polit-o¨konomische Ansa¨tze unterstellen, dass perso¨nlicher Eigennutz maßgeb-
lich fu¨r die Zustimmung zu Umverteilungsmaßnahmen ist. Allerdings ko¨nnen vornehmlich
eigennutzbasierte Modelle keine Begru¨ndung dafu¨r liefern, dass in vielen Industriela¨ndern
scheinbar eine Mehrheit der Wa¨hler progressive Steuersysteme bevorzugt. Um eine mo¨glichst
umfassende Analyse der Determinanten der individuellen Pra¨ferenzen fu¨r Steuerprogression
zu erhalten, werden neben vornehmlich eigennutzbasierten Erkla¨rungsfaktoren auch Fair-
nessaspekte (z.B. Gerechtigkeitspra¨ferenzen, wirtschaftliche Beliefs und die wahrgenommene
Gerechtigkeit des Status quo) betrachtet.
Die empirischen Analysen basieren auf repra¨sentativen Umfragedaten fu¨r Deutschland, die
im Rahmen der Allgemeinen Bevo¨lkerungsumfrage der Sozialwissenschaften (ALLBUS) im
Jahr 2000 erhoben wurden. Neben Informationen u¨ber Steuerpra¨ferenzen entha¨lt ALLBUS
zahlreiche Daten zu individuellen Gerechtigkeitsu¨berlegungen sowie der objektiven sozioo¨ko-
nomischen Situation der Befragten.
Die Ergebnisse unserer empirischen Untersuchung zeigen, dass die individuelle Einstellung
gegenu¨ber einer progressiven Besteuerung nicht alleine durch Eigennutzu¨berlegungen deter-
miniert wird. Vielmehr spielen Gerechtigkeitsu¨berlegungen bei der Pra¨ferenzenbildung eine
maßgebliche Rolle: Personen, die keine ausgepra¨gte Pra¨ferenz fu¨r eine Verteilung auf Basis
des Bedarfsprinzips aufweisen, die individuelle Anstrengung als wesentlich fu¨r wirtschaft-
lichen Erfolg erachten und die bestehende Einkommensverteilung als gerecht beurteilen, for-
dern weniger ha¨ufig progressive Steuersa¨tze. Mit der Erkenntnis, dass Individuen nicht
immer dasjenige Steuersystem pra¨ferieren, das ihnen selbst den gro¨ßten Nutzen verspricht,
sondern auch Fairnessmotive in ihrem Urteil beru¨cksichtigen, gehen wichtige politische Im-
plikationen einher: So sollte eine erfolgreiche Pra¨sentation von (wachstumsfo¨rdernden) Steu-
erreformen auch auf Gerechtigkeitsaspekte eingehen.
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1 Introduction
Highly progressive tax systems confront high income individuals and companies with sub-
stantial marginal tax rates. Thus, they entail disincentives for private economic activity and
may hamper potential growth. Therefore, the introduction of alternative tax systems might
be a desirable part of a growth enhancing fiscal strategy. However, a transition towards
a less progressive tax schedule or even a flat tax is regularly confronted with opposition.
Radical flat tax regimes have only been possible within very few countries. Obviously, tax
progression is a majority preference in many industrial countries.
The reasons for the popularity of tax progression are not well understood. Basically, two
alternative but not necessarily mutual exclusive explanations compete: self-interest and
fairness concerns.
The self-interest view is firmly rooted in political-economic theories of public redistribution.
These approaches postulate that individuals choose their preferred tax rate based on a narrow
self-interest calculus (e.g., Hettich and Winer, 1997). Thus, increasing income redistribution
should be supported by persons that benefit financially (net recipients) and opposed by
those who are net payers to the welfare state (e.g., Meltzer and Richard, 1981). From that
perspective, tax progression is popular simply because its distributive costs are imposed on
a minority of voters.
The fairness view is supported by a more recent literature which indicates that the concept of
the purely rational homo oeconomicus may be misleading since it has been shown empirically
that fairness motives are likely to affect individual decision making (e.g., Konow, 2003) and
policy preferences (e.g., Heinemann et al., 2009). From that perspective, people support
progression because they regard it as fairer compared to a flat tax schedule.
This paper wants to widen the understanding for the relative merits of both explanations.
The basic analytical idea originates from the fact that both explanations should differ in their
empirical outcomes with respect to one key property. If the self-interest view offers the sole
relevant explanation, than the support or rejection of progression should be largely driven
by proxies which indicate a winner/loser position vis-a`-vis tax progression. If, however,
fairness considerations are also relevant, even losers from tax progression may be among its
supporters.
Thus, this contribution fills an important gap in our understanding of tax system preferences.
Here it is of substantial policy relevance since the knowledge of the determinants of individual
tax preferences is crucial when it comes to an assessment of the political feasibility of tax
reform proposals.
This paper relates to empirical analyses of individual preferences for income redistribution
(e.g., Corneo and Gru¨ner, 2002; Alesina and Fuchs-Schu¨ndeln, 2007; Alesina and Giuliano,
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2009). However, we do not focus on general preferences for redistribution but on attitudes
toward progressive taxation. The empirical evidence indicates that self-interest may not be
the only impact factor of individual attitudes on tax progression. Although Hite and Roberts
(1991) find that self-interest is partly reflected in taxpayers’ assessment of vertical equity of
income tax, Wilensky (1976) shows that the perceived fairness of taxes depends mainly on
subjective feelings rather than on their objective level or equity. Nevertheless, his results
suggest a self-serving bias in taxpayers’ perception since they assess their own (income)
group as relatively deprived, while the position of other taxpayers is considered as beneficial.
Indicating the relevance of fairness aspects, Ackert et al. (2006) offer experimental evidence
on decisions about tax structures stressing the high explanatory impact of inequality aversion
(as suggested by the Fehr-Schmidt model (Fehr and Schmidt, 1999)). Furthermore, Slemrod
(2006) shows that US-citizens are more likely to support a substantial tax reform if they
judge the current system to be unfair.
Our results are based on data from the German General Social Survey (ALLBUS) which is
designed to be representative for the German population. ALLBUS includes questions on
the preferred structure of tax rates and several fairness aspects as well as information on
socioeconomic characteristics of the respondents. The findings indicate that individual tax
attitudes do not only reflect the respondents’ financial benefits of a certain tax structure but
are found to be driven by fairness considerations as well. Hence, we reject the view that
the popularity of tax progression results simply from income distribution (as suggested by
Meltzer and Richard, 1981) and the fact that the winners of progression have a majority
of votes. Although we control for the respondents’ social status, fairness related indicators
contribute substantially to explaining individual variance in progression preferences.
The remainder of this paper is organised as follows: The second section offers some facts
about the attitudes toward progressive taxation among German voters. The subsequent
section is devoted to the identification of the individual determinants of preferences for pro-
gressive tax rates. The econometric results are presented in section 4 and some concluding
remarks are offered in section 5.
2
2 Attitudes toward progressive taxation within the German
population
To analyse the individual determinants of voters’ attitudes toward progressive taxation, we
employ data from the German General Social Survey (ALLBUS).4 This data set entails
valuable information on the respondents’ assessment of several policies and political reform
fields. Furthermore, ALLBUS offers data on the participants’ socioeconomic situation as well
as their economic and fairness beliefs, fairness preferences and judgements on the fairness
of the status quo. This survey has been conducted biannually since 1980 and is designed
to be representative for the German population.5 In the present study, we focus on data
collected in the year 2000 survey that includes also questions designed for the International
Social Survey Programme (ISSP). In the context of the ISSP-survey Social Inequality III the
respondents were asked to answer the following question related to their tax preferences: Do
you think people with high incomes should pay a larger share of their income in taxes than
those with low incomes, the same share or a smaller share? The participants could choose
between the following answers: People with high incomes should pay a larger or much larger
share, the same share or a smaller respectively a much smaller share of their incomes in
taxes than people with lower incomes. While the first two alternatives relate to progressive
tax rates, the latter correspond to a proportional respectively regressive income taxation.
Figure 1 depicts the response pattern. It is remarkable that a clear majority of the German
population (nearly 80 percent) seems to be in favour of a progressive taxation.6 The share
of the respondents’ preferring a proportional tax rate is considerably lower (19 percent),
while the number of individuals choosing a regressive taxation can be neglected. The three
bars on the right show the tax structure preferences for different income groups.7 Following
political-economic models, we would expect a strong link between a person’s income and his
4Further information is made available on the ALLBUS website: http://www.gesis.org/en/services
/data/survey-data/allbus/
5From 1980 to 1986 and in 1991, the ALLBUS program was funded by the DFG. For all other surveys, state
and federal funding has made available trough GESIS (Gesellschaft sozialwissenschaftlicher Infrastruk-
tureinrichtungen). ALLBUS/GGSS is a joint project of the Center for Survey Research and Methodology
(ZUMA - Zentrum fu¨r Umfragen, Methoden und Analysen e.V., Mannheim) and the Central Archive
for Empirical Social Research (ZA- Zentralarchiv fu¨r Empirische Sozialforschung, Cologne) in coopera-
tion with the ALLBUS scientific council. Data and documentation are obtainable through the Central
Archive for Empirical Social Research (ZA, Cologne). The institutions and persons mentioned above
bear no responsibility for the use or interpretation of the data in this publication.
6It is possible that this result is rather upward biased since the respondents may be not familiar with the
concept of tax progression. Several studies indicate that individuals tend to choose a higher degree of
progression when confronted with abstract questions (like the one used here) rather than on examples
offering concrete tax liabilities for different income groups (e.g., Roberts et al., 1994).
7The allocation of the ALLBUS participants is based on their self-assessed net monthly income. The net
income of the 25th percentile is below 650 Euro, while the individuals belonging to the 75th percentile
earn at least 1529 Euro.
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Figure 1: Preferences on income tax share for high income people
preferences concerning taxation (e.g., Hettich and Winer, 1997). In their application of a
median voter framework Meltzer and Richard (1981) analyse the resulting level of income
redistribution. The decisive median voter will choose a positive tax rate as long as he has a
below average income and thus benefits from income redistribution.
Applied to the individual attitudes toward different tax rates, we expect people with high
incomes to be less likely to choose a progressive tax rate than those with low incomes.
However, Figure 1 reveals a surprising uniformity of opinion across the different income
groups. Even though the share of respondents favouring a progressive taxation is in fact
decreasing in income, the relationship seems to be rather weak. Although they bear financial
losses from a progressive tax rate, still 77 percent of the participants belonging to the upper
income quantile prefer such a tax scheme (compared to 86 percent of the respondents within
the 25th percentile).
The majority of voters seem to approve a tax system that draws more on persons’ with high
income than on those with a lower income. Although self-interest seems to correspond to
these attitudes, the link is far from being as close as suggested by conventional political-
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economic theory.8 This raises the question for other relevant driving factors (besides self-
interest) of individual attitudes toward tax structures. Since taxation is an instrument of the
government to redistribute market incomes, it is reasonable to expect that fairness aspects
play a major role in the formation of the corresponding attitudes.
3 Potential determinants of individual attitudes towards
progressive taxation
The individual views on the design of the tax structure potentially depend on very different
factors. First, self-interest should be important as individuals are affected differently by a
given tax design. Second, the level of information about taxation might differ. Furthermore,
people may entertain diverging beliefs on the role of incentives and the reasons of inequality.
This can result in different conclusions about the effectiveness and necessity of progressive
taxation. Third, it is reasonable to assume that individuals judge tax structures based on
their views on the fairness of the existing income distribution. Thus, the following section is
devoted to the identification of potential drivers of the diverging attitudes toward progressive
taxation and their potential impact on tax policy assessment.
Self-interest
Political-economic models suggest that individual support for or resistance against income
redistribution is driven mainly by self-interest. While the net-recipients of purely redistribu-
tive policies should be in favour of their expansion, net-payers should oppose these measures.
Meltzer and Richard (1981) show that the median voter will choose a positive tax rate as long
as he earns less than the population average and thus benefits financially from income re-
distribution.9 Applied to the decision about the degree of tax progression, one would expect
support from individuals that are net-recipients from such a policy. Since the tax liability
is disproportionately higher for wealthy individuals than for those with low incomes, it is
reasonable to expect that former will be less likely to support a progressive tax scheme.10
Financial self-interest has been proved relevant for the assessment of tax policies (for a
survey see McGowan, 2000). Hite and Roberts (1991) find that individuals in higher income
brackets are less content with the fairness of steeply progressive tax rates. Furthermore, the
financial situation of individuals has been found to affect the perceived fairness of different
8On the other hand, it is not clear whether the weak link between a persons income and his tax preferences
reflects the possibility that person with an income above the 75th percentile do not regard themselves
as high income recipients. If this is the case, the desire for progressive taxation may be motivated by
self-interest: The people want others (the rich) to pay taxes.
9The voters take work disincentives due to redistribution and the resulting welfare loss into account.
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taxes or tax systems (e.g., Slemrod, 2006; Dornstein, 1987) as well as the support of actual
reforms (e.g., Edlund, 1999).
Simple political-economic models are, however, not able to explain why individuals support
redistributive policies (e.g., via a progressive taxation) although they have to bear financial
losses from it. One possible explanation based on self-interest is offered by Be´nabou and
Ok (2001). Given the possibility of income mobility, it might be rational for the currently
rich (poor) to support (oppose) redistribution if they expect to earn less (more) than the
population average in the future. Another aspect of income mobility has been stressed
by Piketty (1995). Experienced social mobility is likely to form the beliefs concerning the
relative importance of individual effort for economic success. Individuals who experienced
upward mobility may stress the relevance of effort, while those facing a loss in social status
may ascribe this to bad luck (this has been proven empirically for Russia, see Ravallion
and Lokshin, 2000). Using US survey data, Alesina and Giuliano (2009) find that upward
mobility tends to decrease individual preferences for redistribution.
To account both for the respondents’ static and dynamic (i.e. mobility related) self-interest
we exploit information of self-reported social status over time.11 ALLBUS contains data
about the respondents’ placement in the social stratum in the year the survey has been
conducted as well as 10 years ago. Based on this information we construct the variables social
status12 and social mobility. The latter takes a negative value for individuals experiencing
downward mobility and a positive value for those who experienced upward mobility. For the
corresponding regression coefficients negative signs are expected.
Information
The level of information has found to influence the individual assessment of economic policy.
Boeri et al. (2002) and Boeri and Tabellini (2007) show that a better knowledge of the
functioning and costs of unfunded pension systems relates to a higher support for pension
reforms. Heinemann et al. (2009) find that highly educated and politically informed persons
are more likely to approve labour market deregulations. In the context of tax systems, the
level of information is likely to be reflected in individual policy assessments.
11ALLBUS offers only information on the respondents’ reported net income. To assess the financial self-
interest related to tax structures, we would need information on their incomes before taxes and transfers.
Furthermore, a considerable share of ALLBUS participants do not report their income. Using the indi-
vidual net income as a proxy for self-interest is related to a substantial loss of observations. Table A2 (in
the appendix) shows that the social status is positively correlated to both the reported net income and
the level of education. We also conducted regression using the individuals’ income instead of their social
status and found that the results remain robust (obtainable from the authors).
12This variable is based on a ordinal scale from 1 to 10. A high (low) value corresponds to a position at the
top (bottom) of the society. More information on this and other included variables is available in Table
A3 in the appendix.
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Slemrod (2006) argues that the observable preference of US citizens for a flat or sales tax
mirrors at least partly misconceptions about the degree of tax progression of the current
system. Furthermore, Sheffrin (1993) points out that tax policy concepts are rather com-
plex and not discussed properly in the public. The general publics’ lack of knowledge about
taxation (especially related to the concept of progression) is reflected in the fact that the
framing of survey questions is likely to affect the respondents’ answers (Roberts et al., 1994).
Confronted with abstract questions the majority of the respondents seems to prefer a pro-
gressive system, which is not the case if the respondents are offered a concrete example (e.g.,
declaration of just tax payments for different income groups). Furthermore, the evaluation
of tax structures depends on whether the tax payments of different income groups have been
presented in rates or in absolute values.
Thus, we would expect that the individual level of information about the tax system should
be relevant for the corresponding answer behavior. Unfortunately, ALLBUS offers no direct
information on the respondents’ knowledge about taxation and different tax schemes. Nev-
ertheless, an empirical analysis of individual attitudes toward progressive taxation should
take the respondents’ level of information into account (at least to minimize possibly biased
results due to minor knowledge).
We make use of two variables to proxy the respondents’ degree of information about taxa-
tion: First, we control for the level of education by introducing a dummy variable university
equal to one for university (as well as university of applied science) graduates. In addition,
we employ the respondents’ opinion on the importance of politics for his personal life. The
perception that political decisions affect the own life and well-being should increase the in-
centive to be informed about major political topics. This relationship has been stressed by
Edlund (2003) who argues that the high relevance of fiscal policy for the Swedish popula-
tion due to the welfare state generousity involves a stronger awareness of topics related to
public finance. Although we would expect that a better information level reduces biases and
misunderstandings, we do not have any a priori knowledge about the direction of this bias.
Beliefs
The relevance of beliefs (e.g., concerning the underlying reasons of inequality) for welfare
state preference has been emphasized by Alesina and Angeletos (2005). It has been shown
empirically that beliefs on the impact of individual effort relative to exogenous factors (like
birth or luck) can explain differences in welfare state preferences (Alesina et al., 2001; Corneo
and Gru¨ner, 2002) as well as in fairness judgements (Faravelli, 2007; Bischoff et al., 2008).
The implicit assumption that everyone is responsible for his own economic situation and
that existing inequality results from differences in individual effort should lead to a less
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favourable assessment of progressive taxation. The same is expected for individuals believing
that incentives affect individual effort. The disincentives of increasing marginal tax rates
for private economic activity should be weighted more and, thus, lead to a more critical
assessment of tax progressivity. The respondents’ beliefs concerning the reasons for economic
success are captured by the dummy variable effort. This variable takes on the value one for
participants stating that differences in social status reflect individual variations in effort. For
the corresponding regression coefficient a negative sign is expected.
A further belief that may be relevant for tax preferences is related to the procedural fairness
of the political system. Following the concept of procedural fairness, the perceived justice of a
certain (policy) outcome depends on the underlying decision making process. Procedurally
fair decisions should meet criteria like a voice for everyone, neutral decision makers and
transparent decision procedures (as stated by Leventhal, 1980 and Tyler, 2000). It has
been shown that procedural fairness increases the acceptance of decisions with unfavourable
outcomes (e.g., Sondak and Tyler, 2007) as well as the perceived fairness of social inequality
(Bischoff et al., 2008). The respondents’ beliefs on the degree of procedural fairness of the
German political system is measured based on their assessment of the functioning of the
democracy. The impact of the resulting dummy variable democracy (equal to one for those
claiming to be (fully) satisfied with the democracy as practiced in Germany; 0 otherwise)
is theoretically ambiguous. It may be reasonable to assume that the effectiveness of the
democratic system fosters the voters’ trust in the usage of taxpayers’ money. The belief in
an effective use of public money might increase the willingness to pay higher taxes for all
voters and thus facilitates the acceptance of taxes in general. Nevertheless, a comprehensive
empirical analysis of attitudes toward taxation should also control for the belief on procedural
fairness of the decision making process since tax rates are determined politically.
Fairness preferences
The design of a tax system is a major part of redistributive policies in developed countries
(Jesuit and Mahler, 2004). Consequently, fairness preferences are likely to shape the at-
titudes toward progressive taxation. Distributive preferences can be viewed as a kind of
benchmark individuals compare the existing distribution with. Thus, persons favouring a
distribution that guarantees everyone the (financial) means necessary for a reasonable living
(need principle) should diverge in their attitudes toward redistribution from those that prefer
e.g., the equity principle. The respondents’ fairness preferences are indicated by their agree-
ment to the statement that people should have a decent income even without achievement.
For the dummy variable need a positive sign is expected: Other things equal, individuals
preferring a distribution according to the need principle should be more supportive of a
progressive taxation than those without that kind of preference.
8
Fairness assessment of the status quo distribution
Since taxes serve as an instrument for income redistribution, the assessed fairness of the
income distribution is likely to have an impact on the attitudes toward tax progression. It
seems reasonable to expect that individuals who perceive the existing distribution of incomes
and wealth within their country as inadequate should be in favour of redistributive policies.
The judgement of the existing inequality as unfair should increase the demand for redistribu-
tion (e.g., via progressive taxation). Thus, we expect that individuals assessing the existing
social differences as (completely) just as well as those that do not observe a worsening of the
situation of ordinary people are less likely to exhibit preferences for progressive taxes. Next
to information on the respondents’ assessment of the social justice, ALLBUS includes also
a question related to the perceived justice of the own income situation and, thus, allows to
introduce a more egocentric view on the fairness of the income distribution. The participants
were asked whether the income they receive is appropriate given their achievements. Based
on this information we construct the dummy variable adequate wage that equals one for re-
spondents stating to be (at least) adequately paid relative to their effort. It is hypothesized
that the individuals’ satisfaction with their own earnings is related to a lower demand for
redistribution and therefore progressive taxation.
Individual characteristics
A number of personal characteristics are likely to go along with preferences for progressive
taxation. Some of these characteristics capture specific aspects of the above discussed aspects
of self-interest, information, beliefs or fairness assessments that cannot be observed directly.
In addition, however, personal characteristics account for new aspects.
Focusing on policy preferences of German citizens, it is necessary to account for the historical
feature of the existence of the two former German regimes. The socialization under the
communist regime of the former GDR has been found to left its marks in peoples’ minds.
Ockenfels and Weimann (1999) detect significant behavioural differences of Western and
Eastern Germans in public good and solidarity experiments. Even ten years after the political
and economic re-unification, Eastern Germans are still less content with the fairness of
existing social differences in Germany than their western fellow citizens (Bischoff et al.,
2008). Heinemann et al. (2009) show that individuals from the former GDR are more
sceptical towards market-oriented reforms of the labour market than those socialized in the
Western part of Germany. Furthermore, Alesina and Fuchs-Schu¨ndeln (2007) found that,
compared to their Western German countrymen, Eastern Germans have a stronger preference
for redistribution that cannot fully be explained by their relatively low income. Motivated
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by the previous findings we expect that socialization under Communism13 implies a stronger
preference for progressive taxation.
There are several reasons why older people might differ in their welfare preferences from
younger. First, older individuals may remember the substantial social inequalities before the
expansion of the welfare state since the 1970s (Lindbeck, 1995; Heinemann, 2008). These
memories may make them see today’s situation less critical and therefore perceive less neces-
sity to redistribute. Related evidence is provided by Alesina and Giuliano (2009) who find a
significant impact of socialization during early adulthood. The experience of high macroe-
conomic volantility leads to higher preferences for redistribution. Second, uncertainty about
the own economic and social status in life is larger for the young than for the old. Compared
to the old, the perspective of young people with respect to their country’s social situation is
rather characterized by a thicker ”veil of ignorance” (e.g., Rawls, 1971). As a consequence,
the lower insecurity of the old may let them pay less attention to redistribution as an insur-
ance for income risk. However, Sheffrin (1994) points to a possible status quo bias in the
individual attitudes toward progressive taxation. Comparing British and US survey data,
he finds a relative higher preference for progressive taxation among the population in the
UK and traces this back to the fact that the British taxes were more progressive than those
in the US when the surveys have been conducted. It seems reasonable to expect that the
views of older individuals may be more biased in favour of the status quo than younger ones
(e.g., Becker and Zweifel (2008) on health insurance). Therefore the progressivity of the
German income tax system might be reflected in a higher preference for increasing marginal
tax rates especially among older people. Thus, the impact of a person’s age on the tax rate
preferences is a priori not clear.14
A complete research design has to take account of gender since the literature reports that
women have a stronger preference for income redistribution, be it through government policy
or charity (e.g., Piper and Schnepf, 2008; Alesina and Giuliano, 2009; Corneo and Gruener,
2002; Delaney and O’Toole, 2008). In addition, a gender gap is reported for beliefs (e.g.,
Schlesinger and Heldman, 2001; Fong, 2001), risk-aversion (e.g., Meier-Pesti and Penz, 2008)
and the sensitivity to inequality (e.g., Schlesinger and Heldman, 2001): Compared to males,
females are more risk-averse and more sensitive to inequality. Therefore, they should be
more supportive for a highly redistributive taxation.
Public employees are less likely to receive a high income than individuals employed in private
enterprises. Furthermore, German officials need not to pay social security contributions.
13Since we are interested in the effect of being socialized in the GDR and not in the respondents’ current
state of residence, our east-dummy is equal to one for respondents’ born in the former GDR.
14The existing empirical evidence is rather mixed: Both focusing on US data, McGowan (2000) observes
a stronger preference for a flat tax among younger respondents than among older ones, while Hite and
Roberts (1991) find a higher older people to be more likely to be in favour of steep progression.
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Thus, people employed in the public sector are likely to pay less of their income in taxes
and mandatory contributions. When it comes to pecuniary self-interest, we expect them to
be in favour of a progressive tax system (relative to private economy employees). A further
argument for diverging tax preferences between workers employed in the public and private
sector is related to bureaucracy theories (e.g., Tullock, 1965). In general, we would expect
bureaucrats to have a distinct interest in taxes in general since they increase their budget
and, thus, power. However, it is a priori not clear which kind of tax structure public sector
employees prefer. Given the German income tax legislation, the progressive tax structure is
accompanied by several tax exemptions making a high number of public staff necessary. This
should be favoured by public employees (Niskanen, 1971). We expect therefore individuals
employed in the public sector to be more likely to prefer a progressive tax scheme.
Table A1 contains the descriptive statistics of the variables included in our econometric
analysis. Furthermore, we report the correlation between the exogenous variables in Table
A2. It is worthwhile mentioning that the correlation between the explanatory variables is
quite low indicating that the multicollinearity problem should be not very severe.
4 Results
Table 1 displays the results of the empirical analyses of the determinants of German voters’
attitudes toward progressive taxation. We employ a probit approach since the dependent
variable assumes the value of one for respondents choosing a (steeply) progressive taxation
and a value of zero for those preferring proportional or regressive tax rates. The specification
in the first column focuses on the individuals’ self-interest. The second column includes
proxies for the respondents’ fairness preferences and beliefs. The variables capturing the
respondents’ fairness assessment are introduced in the specification shown in column 3.
The final specification includes all categories of impact factors (column 4). The individual
characteristics as well as the proxies for the respondents’ level of information are controlled
for in all specifications. There are basically two reasons for a gradual inclusion of the different
categories of impact factors: First, this proceeding serves as a robustness check. Second, some
of the impact factors are likely to be channels through which other included determinants
affect the individual attitudes toward progressive taxation. In their empirical analysis of
German survey data, Bischoff et al. (2008) show that the respondent’s fairness perception of
the status quo is shaped by fairness preferences, beliefs on the sources of economic success
and the degree of procedural fairness as well as self-interest and several socioeconomic factors.
Thus, it is meaningful to analyze the impact of the different categories of explanatory factor
both separately and jointly to get valuable information on the net effects.
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Table 1: Determinants of German voters’ attitudes toward progressive taxation
Variables (1) (2) (3) (4)
Self-interest
Social Status -0.0234 -0.0204 -0.0144 -0.0146
(-2.78)*** (-2.34)** (-1.48) (-1.48)
Social Mobility -0.0109 -0.0074 -0.0078 -0.0033
(-1.42) (-0.95) (-0.92) (-0.38)
Information
University 0.0315 0.0078 0.0304 0.0131
(1.07) (0.25) (0.95) (0.39)
Importance Politics -0.0311 -0.0364 -0.0396 -0.0450
(-1.35) (-1.52) (-1.44) (-1.73)*
Fairness preference
Need 0.0587 0.0563
(2.59)*** (2.26)**
Beliefs
Effort -0.0974 -0.0654
(-4.36)*** (-2.45)**
Democracy 0.0323 0.0515
(1.40) (2.00)**
Fairness assessment
Social Differences -0.0736 -0.0497
(-2.71)*** (-1.70)*
Ordinary People -0.0867 -0.1051
(-2.82)*** (-3.31)***
Adequate Wages -0.0872 -0.0877
(-3.39)*** (-3.31)***
Others
Age 0.0010 0.0016 0.0020 0.0026
(1.55) (2.23)** (2.60)*** (3.22)***
Female 0.0289 0.0362 0.0245 0.0333
(1.32) (1.61) (1.00) (1.35)
East 0.0053 0.0045 -0.0173 -0.0062
(0.23) (0.19) (-0.68) (-0.24)
Public Sector 0.0515 0.0525 0.0540 0.0587
(1.75)* (1.79)* (1.70)* (1.90)*
Regression diagnostic
p-value
(joint significance) 0.0005 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
Observations 1324 1223 1071 1015
Pseudo-R2 0.0212 0.0443 0.0604 0.0859
Marginal effect are reported. z-values are given in parentheses. */**/*** denotes significance at 10%/
5% /1% level.
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The findings suggests that self-interest determines the individual preferences for progressive
taxation only partially.15 While the experience of social mobility fails to be significant in
all four regressions, the current social status affects the individual attitudes toward tax
progression as long as the respondent’s fairness assessment of the status quo distribution is
not included. As anticipated, individuals at the top of the society tend to be less likely to
favour progressive tax rates.16
Indicating that the attitudes toward different tax structures are not shaped solely by self-
interest, an essential overall result is the relevance of fairness aspects. First, the fairness
preferences are found to be a significant determinant of individual tax preferences: The
probability of supporting progressive taxation is nearly 6 percentage points higher for indi-
viduals preferring a distribution according to the need principle than for those entertaining
different fairness preferences. Second, the respondents’ economic beliefs are reflected in their
views on tax policy. Persons attributing differences in social status to the interpersonal vari-
ation in effort show a 6.5 to 9.7 percentage points lower likeliness of favouring marginal tax
rates that increase in income. The impact of the belief concerning the functioning of the
democratic system is, however, less clear cut: Controlling for the perceived fairness of the
status quo, we find that the satisfaction with the effectiveness of the political system leads to
a 5 percentage points higher probability of demanding a relatively higher taxation of wealthy
persons.
Little surprising, the assessed justice of the existing distributive situation is a relevant driving
factor for the individual tax preference. Being content with the fairness of social differences
lowers the probability of favouring tax progressivity by 5 to 7 percentage points. Quantita-
tively more important is the perceived situation of ordinary people. Individuals who do not
gauge a worsening of the situation of ordinary people show a 8.7 to 10.5 lower tendency to
demand a disproportional higher taxation of high income recipients. Finally, the satisfaction
with the fairness of the own earnings leads to a significantly lower support for progressive
taxes. The perceived justice of the own earnings has (with a marginal effect of about 9
percentage points) proven to be relevant for the formation of welfare state preferences.
While our proxies for the respondents’ level of information do not contribute significantly
to the explanation of tax attitudes, the respondents’ age and employment in the public
sector are found to have a significant impact on the tax preferences. Both public employees
and older people are more likely to be in favour of a progressive taxation. Surprisingly,
the results do not confirm a specific “GDR-effect” on people’s preferences for progressive
15Several other empirical studies on tax and redistributive preferences also provide a mixed evidence on the
relevance of self-interest (Sears and Funk, 1991).
16The variable’s social status loss of significance is mainly a result of its positive correlation with the variable
adequate wage. The latter is a rather self-centered view on the justice of incomes and may reflect partly
the respondents’ self-interest.
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taxation. Since different attitudes toward the welfare state between Eastern and Western
Germans have been confirmed empirically (e.g., by Alesina and Fuchs-Schu¨ndeln, 2007) the
missing significance of the east-dummy may indicate that we already controlled for the factors
that draw responsible for the observable divergence in redistributive preferences.
5 Conclusion
Economic approaches to explain the size of the welfare state are usually based on the as-
sumption of purely rational individuals. Thus, individual demand for redistribution should
result from the position in the income distribution. Our findings indicate that an analysis of
individual tax preferences that focuses solely on purely selfish impact factors leaves out an
important part of the story. Individuals do not only choose the tax system that is most ben-
eficial to them but care also about its fairness. Consequently, even high income individuals
may support a tax system where they have to pay a larger share of their income in taxes
than low income earners. Especially the fairness preferences, beliefs on the reasons for in-
equality and the perceive justice of the status quo distribution contribute to the explanation
of individual heterogeneity in attitudes toward progressive taxation.
Our findings are highly relevant when it comes to actual implementation of tax reforms. To
get the necessary voter support for potentially growth-enhancing tax policies (via a lower
degree of tax progression) it is important to address also the fairness-related concerns about
such a reform. Focusing on fairness aspects seems to be an essential issue for a successful
selling of reforms. Especially the perception of decreasing social justice determines the voters’
preference for a progressive taxation. Since high marginal tax rates may lower individual
work incentives, they may result in a higher injustice of the income distribution. To overcome
this potential vicious circle, politicians should e.g., stress the relevance of industriousness for
economic success as well as the impact of incentives for individual effort. Given our results,
the belief that everyone is responsible for his own economic situation should increase also
the voters’ support for tax reforms aiming to reduce disincentives resulting from marginal
tax rates increasing in income.
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Appendix
Table A1: Descriptive Statistics
Variables Observations Mean Std. Dev. Min. Max.
Dependent Variable
Tax Progression 1364 0.7957 0.4034 0 1
Self-interest
Social Status 1408 5.4622 1.4883 1 10
Social Mobility 1401 0.2191 1.5762 -9 6
Information
University 3757 0.1392 0.3462 0 1
Importance Politics 3804 0.6728 0.4693 0 1
Fairness preference
Need 3665 0.4836 0.4998 0 1
Beliefs
Effort 3595 0.5706 0.4951 0 1
Democracy 3713 0.4929 0.5000 0 1
Fairness assessment
Social Differences 3676 0.4178 0.4933 0 1
Ordinary People 3563 0.7340 0.4419 0 1
Adequate Wages 1210 0.5240 0.4996 0 1
Others
Age 3804 47.58 17.23 18 95
Female 3804 0.5209 0.4996 0 1
East 3804 0.3826 0.4861 0 1
Public Sector 3804 0.1255 0.3314 0 1
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Table A2: Correlations between the explanatory variables
Net Social Social University Importance Need Effort Democracy Social Ordinary Adequate Age Female East Public
Income Status Mobility Politics Differences People Wages Sector
Net Income 1
Social Status .30*** 1
Social Mobility .22*** .41*** 1
University .34*** .21*** .06** 1
Importance Politics .19*** .16*** .05* .12*** 1
Need -.17*** -.07*** -.07*** -.10*** -.11*** 1
Effort .03 .06** .07** -.09*** .03** -.06*** 1
Democracy .15*** .15*** .11*** .08*** .14*** -.08*** .11*** 1
Social Differences .14*** .10*** .11*** .02 .06*** -.09*** .36*** .24*** 1
Ordinary People .13*** .11*** .06** .08*** .07*** -.10*** .10*** .15*** .21*** 1
Adequate Wage .16*** .20*** .15*** .03 .08*** -.06** .15*** .18*** .22*** -.13*** 1
Age .07*** -.03 -.15*** -.02 -.02 .04** .14*** .05*** .06*** .02 .13*** 1
Female -.36*** -.03 -.03 -.09*** -.08*** .05*** -.03* -.05*** -.04*** .06*** -.06** .07*** 1
East -.22*** -.26*** -.13*** -.02 -.10*** .10*** -.07*** -.18*** -.17*** .10*** -.15*** .06*** .02 1
Public Sector .25*** .11*** .05** .19*** .07*** -.06*** -.07*** .03* -.01 -.01 -.01 -.13*** .05*** -.07*** 1
*/**/*** denotes significance at 10%/5% /1% level.
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Table A3: Variable Explanations
Variable Unit Explanation Categories Corresponding
ALLBUS question
Dependent variable
Tax Progression Dummy Respondent’s preference for progressive 1, if the respondent v714
tax rates. favours a (steep) progression.
Self-interest
Social Status Ordinal Respondent’s position in 1 (bottom) — 10 (top) v724
scale the social stratum.
Social Mobility Ordinal Change in respondent’s position in the -9 — 6 v724/ v725
scale social stratum during the last ten years.
Information
University Dummy Respondent’s level of education. 1, if the respondent has an v230/v231
university (for applied science) degree.
Importance Dummy Politics strongly influence 1, if the respondent approves. v210
Politics our lives.
Fairness preference
Need Dummy Decent income even 1, if the respondent approves. v167
without achievement.
Beliefs
Effort Dummy Differences in social standing as 1, if the respondent approves. v169
incentive for individual achievement.
Democracy Dummy Satisfaction with the 1, if the respondent is (fully) satisfied. v211
German democracy.
Fairness assessment
Social Dummy The social differences are just. 1, if the respondent approves. v170
Differences
Ordinary People Dummy Life for ordinary people is 1, if the respondent approves. v27
not getting worser.
Adequate Wage Dummy Just pay given skills and effort. 1, if the respondent approves. v734
Others
Age Discrete Age of the respondent. 18 — 95 v219
variable
Female Dummy Sex of the respondent. 1, if the respondent is female. v216
East Dummy Origin of the respondent. 1, if the respondent has been born in the former GDR. v465
Public Dummy Employment of the respondent 1, if the respondent is a public employee. v256
Sector in the public sector.
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